In a sample of 102 non-European Union countries, we study variations in the decision to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). There is evidence that more powerful countries are less likely to adopt IFRS, consistent with more powerful countries being less willing to surrender standard-setting authority to an international body. There is also evidence that the likelihood of IFRS adoption at first increases and then decreases in the quality of countries' domestic governance institutions, consistent with IFRS being adopted when governments are capable of timely decision making and when the opportunity and switching cost of domestic standards are relatively low. We do not find evidence that levels of and expected changes in foreign trade and investment flows in a country affect its adoption decision: thus, we cannot confirm that IFRS lowers information costs in more globalized economies. Consistent with the presence of network effects in IFRS adoption, we find that a country is more likely to adopt IFRS if its trade partners or countries within in its geographical region are IFRS adopters.
domestically developed accounting standards over IFRS, and this list includes some large economies like Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, India, and the US. 1 We investigate why there is heterogeneity in countries' decisions to adopt IFRS; in other words, why some countries adopt IFRS while others do not. Understanding countries' adoption decisions can provide insights into the benefits and costs of IFRS adoption.
We focus our analysis on a sample of 102 non-EU countries and examine IFRS adoption over the period 2002 through 2007. 2 We exclude the EU member states from our tests because their decision to adopt IFRS was closely tied to the establishment of the IASB itself (EC, 2000) .
Moreover, the EU member states committed jointly to adopting IFRS (EC, 2002) making an analysis of their individual adoption decisions infeasible.
We use the economic theory of networks to develop our hypotheses: adopting a set of standards like IFRS can be more appealing to a country if other countries have adopted it as well (in this sense, IFRS can be a product with "network effects"). In other words, countries do not adopt IFRS all at once, and the observed inter-temporal increase in IFRS adoption across countries can be due to the growing value of the IFRS "network." We focus our analysis of network effects at the regional and trade levels. Accordingly, we test whether the likelihood of 3 distant from Europe are likely to be less accepting of IFRS (Ding et al., 2005; Ciesielski, 2007; and Norris, 2007) . Thus, we also test whether cultural differences can explain cross-sectional variation in IFRS adoption.
In addition to the macro-level economic and political factors discussed earlier, it is likely that a country's decision to adopt IFRS is influenced by its internal politics: e.g., the actions of special-interest lobbyists and ideology-driven regulators. It is difficult to specify the nature of such within-country politics in a large sample of countries, let alone measure it with a reasonable degree of accuracy: only in more transparent societies like the United States is such an exercise possible. To the extent that the effects of internal politics on IFRS adoption are systematically associated to those of the macro-level determinants we study, the associations documented in our empirical tests can have alternate interpretations. However, we are not aware of any theory that predicts such a systematic association.
On network effects, the data reveal evidence of regional trends in IFRS adoption, i.e., a country is more likely to implement IFRS if other countries in its geographical region are IFRS adopters. We also find evidence that a country is more likely to adopt IFRS if its trade partners are IFRS adopters. The result is significant for at least two reasons: (1) it suggests countries internalize the network effects of IFRS in their adoption decisions; and (2) it suggests that as the network benefits from IFRS get large, countries may adopt the international standards even if the direct benefits from such standards are inferior to those from locally developed standards.
On economic determinants of IFRS adoption, we find no evidence that the level of and expected changes in foreign investment and trade affect the likelihood of adoption. Thus, we cannot confirm that IFRS lowers information costs in more globalized economies. We do find, however, evidence that the likelihood of IFRS adoption at first increases and then decreases in the quality of countries' domestic governance institutions. That quality is measured using a factor that extracts common variation from a set of proxies measuring the process and output of countries' governance systems (including, an economic democracy index and citizen wealth).
The result on governance quality can be interpreted as consistent with both the most poorly governed countries being less responsive to international standards, and all other countries conditioning their IFRS adoption decisions on the opportunity and switching costs of domestic governance standards.
4
There is also evidence that political considerations affect IFRS adoption decisions. We find that more powerful countries are less likely to adopt IFRS, consistent with more powerful countries being less willing to surrender standard-setting authority to the IASB. Country-level power is measured as the first principal component of a set of proxies for countries' abilities to influence international decision making (including their size and popularity within the United Nations). In contrast to the results on power, we do not find evidence of countries' cultural closeness to the EU influencing their IFRS adoption decisions, where more Christian countries and countries with long-settled colonial relations with EU powers are considered culturally closer to the region.
Academic theories yield mixed predictions on whether the adoption of IFRS is beneficial to a country. Some scholars have argued that international harmonization in accounting can improve capital-market efficiency: a common set of international accounting standards can reduce the information processing and auditing costs to market participants (Barth, 2007; 2008) .
Other academics argue that accounting standards evolve in the context of domestic cultural, legal, and other institutional features (including auditing): international harmonization in accounting, if it is not accompanied by changes to related capital market institutions, can be costly (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Ball, 2006) . 5 Our analysis of the cross-sectional variation in country-level IFRS adoption decisions suggests there is evidence consistent with both sets of arguments. The evidence of a higher IFRS adoption rate among countries with moderate governance standards is consistent with IFRS being adopted for reasons that can be beneficial to a country. At the same time, the evidence that the best governed and most powerful non-EU countries were, as of 2007, less likely to adopt IFRS, suggests that several countries still perceived IFRS as being costly.
The existing empirical literature on IFRS has focused largely on the determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption at the firm level. 6 The firm-level studies are conditional on countries' decisions to allow or mandate IFRS, suggesting that studies of IFRS adoption at the country-level can complement firm-level studies. A study by Hope et al. (2006) provides some preliminary evidence on country-level IFRS adoptions through 2005 in a sample of 38 countries (including 14 EU countries). Their evidence suggests countries with weaker investor protection 5 Leuz and Wysocki (2008) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on accounting harmonization. 6 Examples include Armstrong et al. (2008) , Barth et al. (2008) , Christensen et al. (2008) , and Daske et al. (2008) . 6 1. The direct value from using the Mac: this can include the computer's processing speed, memory, graphical card, user friendliness, etc.
2. The value from other people using Macs: this can include value derived from being able to easily share files, obtaining technical service, using a product that is popular with one's peers, etc.
The direct value is sometimes referred to in the literature as the autarky value of the product, while the network-related value is called the synchronization value (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1996) . The existence of the synchronization value of a product suggests that the product can be adopted even if its autarky value is inferior to that of a substitute product (some frustrated Windows users can testify to this). The synchronization value of a product is also known as the value from network effects.
The economics literature on networks also makes the distinction between direct and indirect network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . Direct network effects are what we will refer to as synchronization value in this paper. It refers to network effects that are endogenous to the product. In the case of Mac computers, an example of direct network effects is the value derived from being able to easily share files as the number of Mac users grows. Indirect network effects refer to the value derived from having lower prices on complementary goods as the number of adopters of a network-dependent product increases. An example of indirect network effects in the case of buying a Mac is the value derived from having lower prices on application software for Macs as the number of Mac users increases. Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) argue from earlier theoretical work (e.g., Knight, 1924 ) that indirect network effects are truly pecuniary in nature and so should not be internalized in the consideration of synchronization value.
A final distinction to make in discussing the economic theory of networks is that between network effects and network externalities (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994) . Network externalities arise when direct network effects are not internalized in the decision to buy a network-dependent product. In the Mac example, this would result if a user purchased a Mac computer solely for its autarky value, only to later discover the added benefits from having easy file-sharing capabilities due to the high rate of Mac adoption among her friends.
Applying the economic theory of networks to country-level IFRS adoption
If IFRS is considered a network-dependent product, then a country's decision to adopt IFRS can be viewed through the lens of autarky and synchronization values. The autarky value of IFRS is the direct value to the adopting country from using the IASB-developed accounting standards. The synchronization value is the value derived from adopting a body of accounting standards that is widely used by other countries.
Given the network framework, a country's decision to adopt IFRS can be expressed as follows.
Adopt IFRS if and only if:
In our analysis of the autarky value of IFRS, we classify the potential direct benefit as arising from economic and political factors. The economic determinants of autarky value are intended to capture direct pecuniary benefits as they are usually conceived in economic models of networks. The political determinants are included to test whether adopters consider the benefits arising from the potentially political nature of international accounting standard setting.
Just as the autarky value of IFRS can be classified into economic and political benefits, the value of local GAAP can be so classified. The economic value of local GAAP refers explicitly to the ability of extant accounting standards to facilitate the efficient allocation of capital in an economy. The political value of local GAAP refers to political benefits from having local authority over standard setting. Grouping together the economic (political) benefits of IFRS with the economic (political) benefits of local GAAP, we can rewrite equation (1) We discuss the terms in equation (2) in greater detail in Section 2.3. The inclusion of political determinants in the equation above is distinct to our setting. In all theoretical models of network-dependent products we are aware of, the product is usually a consumer good where 8 political lobbying for product specification is unlikely to be a major issue. For example, in the earlier case of a user's decision to buy a Mac, the political determinants of autarky would capture the potential benefit to a user from being able to lobby for future features on Macs. Unless the user is a consumer with substantial market power (e.g., the federal government), such political benefits are unlikely to be of concern.
In the context of equation (2) and our earlier discussion on network theory, it is useful to note the following two points. First, a country can adopt IFRS even if the economic benefits from such standards are inferior to those from locally developed GAAP. Second, evidence that synchronization-value proxies explain the IFRS adoption decision is consistent with countries internalizing the network effects of IFRS (i.e., network-effects in IFRS adoption are not network externalities). Both points above have implications for whether IFRS is being adopted for its innate quality or for potential network effects.
Why do countries adopt IFRS?
In this sub-section, we develop the arguments for and against IFRS adoption in the context of the framework in equation (2). Our analysis focuses on IFRS as developed and sponsored by the IASB starting 2002, and specifically excludes International Accounting Standards promulgated by the IASB's predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). This is because there is evidence to suggest that IASC standards are culturally quite different from IFRS. In particular, while the IASB's standards are influenced by Pan-European accounting traditions (as discussed shortly), the IASC's work was perceived as more Anglo-centric. The IASC was established in 1973, the year the UK joined the European Community. Benston et al. (2006, p. 229) argue that by this time, existing European Community countries had made significant progress towards accounting harmonization, and the IASC was created to help the UK have a voice in future cross-country standardization.
As noted in the introduction, we develop our hypotheses around the IFRS adoption decisions of non-EU countries. We exclude the EU member states from our tests because their decision to adopt IFRS was closely tied to the establishment of the IASB itself (EC, 2000) . Moreover, the EU member states committed jointly to adopting IFRS (EC, 2002) making an analysis of their individual adoption decisions infeasible. Finally, there is evidence that the development of institutions and practices of the IASB are made in consultation with the EU. 8 In subsequent univariate tests, we provide evidence on the differences between EU countries and the rest of our sample along adoption determinants identified below.
Net economic value of IFRS
We describe the net economic value of IFRS to a country as arising out of two factors:
(1) the value from having a shared body of accounting standards; and (2) the relative quality of local governance institutions. We discuss these two factors in greater detail below.
The value from having a shared body of accounting standards: IFRS are developed specifically for wide international use. Proponents of IFRS argue that by adopting a common body of international standards, countries can expect to lower the cost of information processing and auditing to capital market participants (Barth, 2007; 2008) . More preparers, users, and auditors of financial reports can be expected to become familiar with one common set of international accounting standards than with various local accounting standards.
If the adoption of IFRS is expected to lower information costs to capital markets, we expect countries more dependent on foreign capital and trade to value these economic benefits more. Absent international accounting standards, foreign investors must incur costs of becoming familiar with domestic accounting practices. These costs are likely to be passed on (at least in part) to the investment-destination country. If adopting IFRS is expected to lower such costs, then we can expect countries that are dependent on foreign capital to do so.
Similarly, countries where foreign trade is an important part of the economy can be expected to adopt IFRS. Related to the point above, it can be argued that countries choose to adopt IFRS when they expect to increase the share of foreign capital and trade in their economy:
expected foreign involvement in an economy can make current adoption of international standards more attractive. In this sense, even countries with low levels of foreign capital and trade can choose to adopt IFRS if they are expecting growth in those factors.
Adopting IFRS to lower information costs is conceptually distinct from adopting IFRS due to its "network benefits." Conceptually, "network benefits" refer to idea that IFRS becomes more appealing as more countries adopt it (see Section 2.3.3); whereas adopting IFRS to lower information costs refer to the standards' potential "platform benefits."
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The relative quality of local governance institutions: We expect the relative quality of local accounting standards to be an important determinant in the decision to adopt IFRS. Local accounting standards are part of a complex system of governance institutions that include auditor training, auditing standards, enforcement (regulatory and judicial), precedent for the protection of property rights, government corruption, and the role of the press, among others (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Watts, 2003; and Ball, 2006) . Thus, in studying the IFRS adoption decision, we consider jointly the relative quality of local accounting standards and that of associated governance institutions. Adopting IFRS can be costly if these institutions are collectively not compatible with the international standards. The relative quality of extant governance institutions refers to the ability of these institutions to facilitate the efficient allocation of capital in an economy.
In countries where the quality of extant governance institutions is relatively high, IFRS adoption is likely to be less attractive. High quality institutions represent high opportunity and switching costs to adopting international accounting standards. The opportunity costs arise because in adopting IFRS, countries forgo the benefits of any past and potential future innovations in local reporting standards specific to their economies. IFRS, by definition, are the result of an international political economy equilibrium, and thus cannot be expected to provide reporting standards that are uniquely suited to any given country's circumstances (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) . The switching costs arise because countries with well developed governance institutions are likely to have well developed capital markets, and thus more market participants needing retraining in IFRS.
For countries where local governance institutions are not well developed, the prediction on IFRS adoption is more nuanced. On one hand, opportunity and switching costs in these countries are lower, so the chance to adopt an externally developed body of accounting standards presents an advantage. On the other hand, such countries are likely to suffer from corrupt, slow-moving, or ineffectual governments that are resistant to or incapable of change (La Porta et al., 1999) . At the extreme, countries with weak institutions are failed states, where the adoption of IFRS is unlikely to be of any interest or consequence (e.g., Taliban- ruled Afghanistan or Somalia). Thus, among countries with less developed institutions, the decision to adopt IFRS is likely to be driven by lower opportunity and switching costs only if such countries are in fact capable and willing to make cost-benefit tradeoffs.
Net political value of IFRS
The adoption of IFRS by a country also involves trading off the potential gain from being able to influence international standard setting against the value lost from surrendering local authority over accounting standards. We describe the tradeoffs between these benefits and costs as constituting the net political value of IFRS to a country. We classify the net political value as arising from two factors: (1) international power politics; and (2) culture politics.
International power politics: Ceteris paribus, we would expect more powerful countries to have a larger positive political value since more powerful countries are more likely to be able to influence the nature of international standards. The influence of powerful countries can be the result of explicit lobbying and pressure tactics or the result of the IASB implicitly catering to powerful interests when developing standards.
The dominant position of the EU in IFRS standard setting presents, however, an important constraint that is likely to alter the prediction above. As noted earlier, the development of IFRS is strongly linked to support from the EU. The IASB is physically situated within the EU, and to date, the EU remains the IASB's largest sponsor (IASB, 2008a) . If a country chooses to adopt IFRS, it must either engage in the political process to try to shape the nature of the international standards, or cede the standard setting role to other political players. It is unlikely that more powerful countries will adopt the latter route;
however, if they choose to engage in the political process, they will likely have to enter into costly political wrangling with the EU. Faced with this choice, it is reasonable to expect that more powerful countries are less likely to adopt IFRS. 10 On the other hand, for less powerful countries, there is little political face lost in adopting EU-centric standards. Thus, ceteris paribus, we can predict that less powerful countries are more likely to adopt IFRS.
Culture politics: In addition to country-level power politics, the perception of IFRS as a
European institution is likely to affect the international standards' acceptance in a country (Ding et al., 2005; Ciesielski, 2007; Norris, 2007) . In countries that are culturally more accepting of European institutions, international accounting standards can be more politically feasible. In countries where European institutions are non-native, adoption of IFRS can be viewed as abrogating authority to a European standard-setter. Thus, ceteris paribus, we predict countries that are culturally closer to Europe are more likely to adopt IFRS.
Synchronization value of IFRS
The synchronization value of IFRS refers to the key idea in network theory: that a network-dependent product becomes more appealing as more countries adopt it. In testing for network benefits, we test for the effects of regional trends in IFRS adoption. We define regions around continental and sub-continental geographies (Appendix A). If countries within a region are influenced by each others' actions, we can expect the likelihood of IFRS adoption for a given country to increase as the number of IFRS adopters in that region increases. As an additional test of network benefits, we examine whether the likelihood of IFRS adoption for a given country increases in the proportion of its trade partners that are IFRS adopters. 
Data and proxies

Developing the dataset
In this sub-section, we describe the construction of our database of non-EU countries and their IFRS adoption status. Our data selection procedures are aimed at generating the widest 13 possible coverage of countries and their adoption status given data requirements for dependent and independent variables. Our dependent variables are the IFRS adoption decision and, where appropriate, the year of adoption. These data are collected from numerous sources including, Deloitte's IASplus.com website, correspondence with country managing partners of big-4 audit firms, web searches of newswire archives, and World Bank country reports. Our independent variables are the proxies for the various IFRS adoption determinants described in the previous section. The proxies are described in the following sub-section. The data selection procedure described above yields a final sample of 102 countries. The countries are listed in Appendix A. As discussed, we obtain the IFRS adoption decision from Deloitte's IASplus.com website. This website does not, however, report the year of IFRS adoption. To obtain adoption-year data, we rely on three different methods: correspondence with country managing partners of big-4 audit firms, web searches of newswire archives, and World Bank country reports. For every country listed as having adopted IFRS on IASplus.com, we contact the country managing partner of a big 4 audit firm with an office in that country requesting data on the date of IFRS adoption. Additionally, we conduct electronic searches of newswire archives for press articles describing a country's adoption of IFRS. Finally, we reference the World Bank's country reports on observance of standards and codes: these reports occasionally detail IFRS adoption dates.
The three auxiliary sources described above jointly yield adoption-year data for every country listed by IASplus.com as having adopted IFRS. In a few cases, data from a country managing partner of a big 4 audit firm or data from the World Bank country reports disagree with the IASplus.com data on the country's adoption status itself. For example, Egypt and Peru were listed on IASplus.com as requiring IFRS for all listed companies, but at least one (non Deloitte) big 4 audit partner in each country disagreed: the partners argued that IFRS was not permitted in those countries. In these circumstances, we err in favor of the big 4 audit partner/ World Bank country report. The disagreement between even big 4 audit firms on the nature of IFRS adoption in some countries suggests that even if a country is formally listed as having adopted IFRS, the adoption may be a token gesture. This is an important caveat to our analysis. Country-level adoption decisions on the IASplus.com website are categorized into four groups: IFRS required for listed companies; IFRS required for some listed companies; IFRS permitted for listed companies; and IFRS not permitted for listed companies. For the purposes of our empirical analyses, we reclassify these four categories into three: adopters; partial adopters;
and non-adopters. The "adopters" in our dataset are those classified by IASplus.com as having "IFRS required for listed companies." The "non-adopters" are those classified as having "IFRS not permitted for listed companies." The "partial adopters" in our dataset are a combination of the second and third IASplus.com categories. We combine these two categories into "partial adopters" since only four countries in our sample of 102 can be classified as having "IFRS required for some listed companies."
Developing proxies for the IFRS-adoption determinants
In this sub-section, we describe our proxies for the determinants of IFRS adoption identified in Section 2.3. The data for these proxies are collected from numerous data sources 
Quality of local governance institutions:
Obtaining good proxies for the quality of local governance institutions is particularly difficult for at least two reasons. First, the governance institutions in a country are likely to be influenced by its natural endowment and endogenous to its other human institutions: thus, a governance system that is "good" (high quality) for one economy can be ineffective in others. A cross-country metric of governance institution quality must account for this potential variation in governance institutions. Second, data to construct detailed cross-country metrics are limited to a few, mostly large economies. In obtaining proxies for the quality of local governance institutions, we consider both process-based and output-based measures. Process-based measures like governance indices are popular in the literature. The problem with these measures, as alluded to earlier, is that different processes are likely to be optimal for different economies, depending on their natural endowments and other human institutions. Output-based measures like GDP are appealing because notwithstanding the process, if the objective of all governance institutions is economic development, outputs are a reliable indicator of the quality of those institutions.
The problem with output-based measures is that natural endowments and human institutions not concerned with governance can influence outputs independently of governance systems.
Our joint use of process and output based measures (through factor analysis, discussed shortly) is an attempt to mitigate these competing costs and benefits.
On process-based measures, we obtain both broader indicators like indices of credit rights (Credit_Rights), property rights (Prop_Rights), and government corruption (Gov_Corruption) from Andrei Shleifer's website and more narrow measures like the number of days to enforce a contract (Days_Enforce) and the number of rules to start a business (Startup_Rules) from the WDI database. In addition, we use the Economist magazine's democracy score (Econ_Democracy). The score (scaled from 1 to 10) is intended to capture the quality of the electoral process, the functioning of government, diversity in political participation, and the extent of civil liberties. Finally, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) refer the literature to an index of the impartiality of the judicial system produced by the Fraser Institute, which we also incorporate in our analysis (Fair_Courts). The broad indices that capture rights of capital owners, judicial processes, corruption, and civil liberties are likely to be correlated with the information and control institutions that facilitate efficient allocation of capital in an economy; they are, however, subjective. The narrower measures like contract-enforcement days and start-up rules are more objective and can proxy for poor government facilitation of business (bureaucratic red tape), or entrenched business interests (oligopolists who have created barriers to entry), or both.
Our primary output-based measure is per capita GDP (GDP_PC). Countries with higher per capita GDP are richer, and thus, more likely to have better developed governance institutions. Of course, as noted earlier, per capita GDP is also influenced by natural endowments, so we calculate a measure of GDP that attempts to separate the effects of the latter, GDP_PC_HI. Specifically, GDP_PC_HI is the residual from an annual regression of per capita GDP on exports of fossil fuels, minerals, and ores. In addition to GDP, we use data on stock market size (Stock_GDP) and turnover (Stock_Turn): the relative size and activity of a country's stock markets can be a reasonable output-based indicator of the quality of its capital market governance. Finally, we use two human-development-based output measures, Infant_Mortality and Adult_Illiteracy. While, the relation between the human development measures and the quality of information and control institutions is likely indirect, countries with the poorest human development are likely to be failed or near-failed states, where adoption of IFRS is unlikely to be of any interest or consequence.
International Power Politics:
We use a host of proxies to identify cross-sectional variation in countries' power status. First, we use the number of years a country has been elected to the 14 In primary analyses, we choose relatively exogenous macroeconomic variables to proxy for the political determinants of IFRS adoption rather than more explicit measures of the relationships between countries and the IASB (e.g., the number of trustees from a given country on the IASC Foundation). Our choice is driven by concerns over endogeneity. We report on regressions using these explicit relationship measures in robustness tests. 15 We do not use proxies for culture developed by Hofstede (1980; 2001) for three reasons: (1) we are interested in measuring cultural closeness to Europe, not culture per se (which is Hofstede's focus), (2) we are interested in keeping the sample as large as possible (we do not want to be limited by Hofstede's sample size); and (3) Hofstede's work has recently come under some criticism in the accounting sociology literature (Baskerville, 2003) .
On economic and political determinants, we have identified numerous individual proxies.
Since these proxies collectively address the determinants we are interested in measuring, we extract common factors from them using principal component analysis. Specifically, we identify the first principal component of the proxies with the widest coverage (details below) for each of the economic and political determinants. In subsequent multivariate tests, we use these common factors in lieu of the individual proxies themselves. Appendix C reports on the factor components, factor loadings, and Eigen values (all above one) for all factors.
On the value from having a shared body of accounting standards, we extract two distinct proxies, one measuring the level of foreign capital and trade and the other the growth. We refer to these factors as "Platform" and "Platform_Chg," respectively, because the direct value from having a shared resource is sometimes referred to in the literature as the "platform benefit." In computing "Platform" and "Platform_Chg," we exclude foreign equity portfolio investments because these data are not available for about 20% of our sample.
Among the numerous process-and output-based measures of the quality of local governance institutions, we use contract-enforcement days, start-up rules, the Economist's democracy index, and per capita GDP to construct the factor, Q_Local_Gov1. Our choice of these particular proxies is driven by their availability for a wide cross-section of countries. The other governance institution proxies are all significantly correlated with Q_Local_Gov1. Figure 1 shows scatter plots for four of those proxies (on the y axes), Fair_Courts, Gov_Corruption, Stock_GDP, and Infant_Mortality, with Q_Local_Gov1 (on the x axis). Of particular interest are Gov_Corruption and Infant_Mortality, since at the extremes, both these proxies can measure the domestic political conditions that make for failed states.
Since per capita GDP is influenced by natural endowments, we calculate a substitute factor, Q_Local_Gov2, which is the first principal component of contract-enforcement days, start-up rules, the Economist's democracy index, and GDP_PC_HI. In subsequent empirical tests, we alternately use both Q_Local_Gov1 and Q_Local_Gov2. The factor "Inter_Power" is used to represent international power politics: it is the first principal component of the number of years a country has been elected to the UNSC, the country's GDP rank, population, and area.
The factor "Culture" is used to proxy for a country's cultural closeness to Europe. It is constructed from the proportion of a country's population that is Christian and Years_Free.
Descriptive statistics and univariate evidence
Sample composition
Our data sources and sample construction process are described in Section 3.1. Table 1 reports the number of countries classified as adopters, partial adopters, and non-adopters. The numbers of adopters and non-adopters are roughly similar at 39 and 40, respectively; while partial adopters include 23 countries. Panel B describes adoption frequency by year. The normal annual adoption rate does not exceed 4 countries per year. Nevertheless, 10 countries from our sample adopted in 2005, the year in which EU member countries adopted.
Descriptive statistics and univariate evidence on autarky value
We compare EU member states and our sample countries in Table 2 , Panel A. The two groups are significantly different on all but a few dimensions. The EU countries are characterized by greater exports and greater foreign direct investment. They tend to have higher quality of local governance institutions as measured by fewer Startup_Rules, higher Econ_Democracy, greater GDP_PC, and a greater value of stocks traded as % of GDP (Stock_GDP). In terms of political power, they have a higher GDP_Rank and a higher representation on the United Nations Security Council (although latter differences are not statistically significant). Overall, there is some evidence that EU countries are more powerful, more reliant on international capital and trade, and more likely to have better governance institutions than non EU countries. Overall, the univariate tests reported in Table 2 provide evidence that non-adopters are more powerful on average than either full or partial adopters. Comparisons along other dimensions yield mixed or no results. We treat this evidence as preliminary and further explore the autarky value of IFRS in our multivariate tests described in Section 5. Table 3 reports correlations among the principal component factors that are used in our multivariate tests.
Correlations between factors that are to enter subsequent regression analyses simultaneously do not exceed 0.3, providing some evidence that the factors capture theoretically autonomous constructs.
Univariate evidence on synchronization value
In The Chi-Squared statistic for a comparison of full adopters, partial adopters, and non-adopters across the 10% export threshold is, however, not statistically significant.
Multivariate model and evidence
Hazard model analysis
Our primary multivariate tests are based on hazard model analyses. The hazard model allows us to test the determinants of countries' IFRS adoption decisions as functions of the relative timing of adoption. Additionally, the hazard model lends itself to investigating how trends in IFRS adoption among other countries affect a given country's adoption decision (network effects).
In the hazard analysis, full adoption of IFRS is modeled as the "failure" event, i.e., the dependent variable is the time to full IFRS adoption. Let "T" be the "survival" time, i.e., the T is set to six, and the dependent variable is treated as censored. 16 In subsequent analysis, we estimate how the hazard rate, h(t), and survival probability, S(t), vary as a function of determinants of IFRS adoption. h(t) and S(t) are defined below.
h(t) = f(t) / S(t) … (3) S(t) = 1 -F(t) … (4)
Where f(t) is the probability density function of T and F(t) is the cumulative probability density function of T.
We estimate two different versions of the hazard model: the counting process hazard model (Therneau and Grambsch, 2000) and the more-familiar Cox proportional hazard model.
The counting-process method is based on a discrete formulation of the dependent variable (i.e., survival time T), which is likely to be more appropriate for our data since we measure T in years (the Cox model assumes T is continuous). Moreover, in situations where the range of possible values for T is low (as in the case of our data where T varies between 1 and 6), BoxSteffensmeier and Jones (2004) argue counting-process method is likely to be more appropriate for hazard analyses. On average, however, the two methods (Cox and counting-process) are expected to yield similar results, which is the case in this paper. Consequently, we only report results based on the counting process model.
A positive coefficient on a covariate in the hazard model implies that the hazard rate is increasing (survival time is decreasing) in that covariate. In other words, a positive coefficient on a covariate implies that the likelihood of IFRS adoption is increasing in the covariate. To provide an estimate of the economic significance of a coefficient, we also report the % change in the hazard rate in our results. The % change in the hazard rate is the % change in h(t) when the value of a covariate in question is changed from its 25 th to its 75 th percentile value.
The independent variables in our hazard analysis are time-varying covariates (TVCs).
TVCs are appropriate for our setting since many of our covariates are based on macroeconomic variables that change over the event measurement period (i.e., 2002 through 2007). As discussed earlier, the TVCs are lagged values, i.e., covariates for 2002 are actually macroeconomic data from 2001 and so on. Lagged TVCs are recommended by Petersen (1995) to avoid the event simultaneity problem in hazard modeling.
If, as we argue, adoption decisions within regions are correlated, then the data are serially dependent and we have less information than will be assumed in computing ordinary standard errors. In other words, if adoption decisions within regions are correlated, ordinary standard errors will be understated. Accordingly, in all our hazard analyses, we cluster standard errors at the region level. The clustering is done using the process described in Lin and Wei (1989) and is 24 likely to be particularly important when evaluating the statistical significance of the proxy for synchronization effects (i.e., the proportion of countries within region that have adopted). Inferences are similar across all four panels of Table 5 . Specifically, the coefficients on proxies for governance institution quality, international power politics, and network effects are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level or greater, while the coefficients on proxies for cultural closeness to Europe and levels and changes of international investment and trade are not. The evidence in Table 5 does not confirm that countries adopt IFRS because they value having a shared body of international standards or that cultural considerations vis-à-vis Europe affect IFRS adoption decisions.
There is evidence that quality of local governance institutions has a non-liner association with IFRS adoption. The first-order coefficients on the factors for governance institutions are positive, while the second-order coefficients are negative. The marginal effects on these coefficients in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that an inter-quartile increase in Q_Local_Gov1 is associated with a 96.38% increase in the hazard of adopting IFRS, while an inter-quartile increase in Q_Local_Gov1^2 is associated with a 28.62% decrease in the hazard rate (intuitively, the hazard measures the conditional probability of IFRS adoption). The evidence suggests that IFRS adoption is less likely among both countries with the poorest governance institutions, where international harmonization of accounting standards is unlikely to be of must interest, and countries with good governance institutions, where IFRS adoption is likely to be associated with high opportunity and switching costs.
The negative coefficients on the proxies for international power politics imply that IFRS adoption is less likely among more powerful countries. This relation is consistent with the proposition that more powerful countries are more wary of losing domestic authority over accounting standard setting. The dominance of the EU in IFRS standard setting and uncertainties in the political process of international standard setting can be associated with the reluctance of more powerful countries to adopt IFRS. The change in hazard statistic for power in panel A of Table 5 is -43.98% indicating that an inter-quartile increase in the Inter_Power covariate is associated with a 43.98% decrease in the hazard ratio.
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The positive coefficients on Pct_Adopt and GDP_Pct_Adopt are consistent with the proposition that IFRS adoption is more likely as the proportion of regional adopters increases.
The positive coefficient on IFRS_Trade is also consistent with the existence of network effects.
The results indicate that countries do account for the network effects of IFRS when considering whether to adopt the international standards: in other words, the network benefits of IFRS cannot be considered externalities. The magnitude of the network proxy in Panel A suggests that when the proportion of IFRS adopters in a region increases from 14% to just about 50%, the hazard of IFRS adoption for a country in that region increases by over 230%.
Overall, from the hazard analyses we can conclude the following: (1) more powerful countries are less likely to adopt IFRS; (2) a country is more likely to adopt IFRS as the proportion of IFRS adopters within its region or among its trade partners increases; and (3) there is a quadratic relation between the quality of local governance institutions and IFRS adoption, where adoption at first increases and then decreases with governance quality.
Additional analyses
As a more explicit measure of switching costs to IFRS, we rerun the regressions after including a dummy for whether IFRS is produced in the country's official language. As of 2008, 17 As noted earlier, we use the number of years a country has served on the UNSC as an input in constructing our measure of power. China, Russia, and the US, as permanent members of the UNSC, are thus assigned relatively high scores on power. None of these three countries have adopted IFRS fully. To ensure that the results on power are not driven by the permanent UNSC members, we repeat the analysis in Table 5 after excluding these countries (China, Russia, and the US) from the sample. The results are substantively unchanged, suggesting that the sign and significance on power in our multivariate analyses are not driven by the disproportionate influence of permanent membership in the UNSC on this measure.
the only IASB-reviewed version of IFRS is in English, thus, the dummy identifies countries with English as an official language (mostly, former British colonies that conduct at least some official government business in English). This variable is not statistically significant, nor does its inclusion in the regressions alter any inferences discussed thus far (results are not tabulated).
In testing the hypothesis that IFRS adoption is more likely among countries that are culturally closer to Europe, we use the proportion of Christians in a population and the number of years since a country became independent from an EU country as our proxies. We deliberately avoid using legal origin to proxy for cultural closeness because legal origin is associated with a colonial relationship, and it is not clear that a previously existing colonial relationship in itself indicates a close cultural tie between colonized and colonizer. Moreover, given that European countries once colonized most of the globe, a measure of closeness based solely on former colonial relationships would identify most countries in the world as culturally close to Europe.
Notwithstanding the argument above, given that the IASB is the successor body to the Anglo-centric IASC (which was popular within the Commonwealth), it is possible that current IASB adopters are more likely to be former British colonies. In other words, it is possible that a substantial fraction of current IASB adopters are carryovers from the IASC regime. We test this conjecture by repeating our multivariate tests upon including a dummy to indicate whether a country has a British-style common law system. The coefficient on this dummy is not statistically significant and already discussed results are unchanged (results unreported).
In the tests reported on so far, we have used relatively exogenous macroeconomic variables to proxy for the political determinants of IFRS adoption. In Table 6 , we report on tests using more explicit variables for the relationships between countries and the IASB. In particular,
we repeat the regressions in Table 5 Both the number of IASC trustees and donations to the IASC are likely to be endogenously determined with the dependent variable, IFRS adoption. In other words, IFRS adopters are more likely to both have representation on the IASC board and be financial supporters of the IASB, and the direction of causality is difficult to specify. Accordingly, the results from the analysis in Table 6 should be interpreted with caution. The results from Panel A suggest that after controlling for determinants discussed earlier, the likelihood of IFRS adoption is increasing in the number of trustees from a given country at the IASC (the coefficient on the trustee variable is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level): an increase from zero to one IASC trustee increases the hazard of IFRS adoption by 181%. However, Panel B finds no evidence of a relationship between IFRS adoption and a country's IASC donation history. The previously discussed inferences from Table 5 are not affected by inclusion of the IASC proxies in Table 6 .
In additional robustness tests, we use a multinomial logit model in lieu of hazard analysis to model the determinants of IFRS adoption. Multinomial logit analysis is less suitable to hazard analysis in our setting because it cannot account for richness in the data about the year of adoption. However, the multinomial logit model allows us to treat full adopters, partial adopters, and non-adopters separately (because the model accommodates nominal data as the dependent variable), rather than force the adoption categories into a binomial choice. The primary findings from the multinomial logit model analysis are that full adoption of IFRS is more likely for countries with higher levels of (but not changes in) international investment and trade, and less likely for more powerful countries and countries with the poorest governance institutions. The multinomial logit tests find no evidence of differences between non-adopters and partial adopters along any of the economic and political determinants except levels of international investment and trade. This finding supports our treatment of partial adopters in the hazard analyses.
Conclusion
We investigate why there is heterogeneity in countries' decisions to adopt IFRS; in other words, why some countries adopt IFRS while others do not. We focus our analysis on a sample of 102 non-EU countries, excluding the EU because of it closeness to the IASB. We examine IFRS adoption over the period 2002 (the first full year of the IASB's existence) through 2007.
We use the economic theory of networks to develop our hypotheses since a standard like IFRS is likely to be more appealing to a country if other countries adopt it as well. In other words, network theory allows us to explain the inter-temporal increase in the adoption of IFRS across countries. We find evidence consistent with the likelihood of IFRS adoption for a given 28 country increasing with the number of IFRS adopters in its geographical region and with IFRS adoption among its trade partners. The result is significant for at least two reasons: (1) it suggests countries internalize the network effects of IFRS in their adoption decisions; and (2) it suggests that as the network benefits from IFRS get large, countries may adopt the international standards even if the direct economic benefits from such standards are inferior to those from locally developed standards.
Economic network theory predicts that in addition to network benefits (synchronization value), a product with network effects can be adopted due to its direct benefits (autarky value) (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1996) . In the case of the IFRS adoption decision by a country, we argue the direct benefits are represented by both the net economic and net political value of IFRS over local standards.
The net economic value of IFRS is intended to capture direct pecuniary benefits as they are usually conceived in economic models of networks. Accordingly, we test whether economies that are more reliant on foreign investment and trade are more likely to adopt IFRS and whether the likelihood of IFRS adoption decreases with the quality of domestic governance institutions (a proxy for both opportunity and switching costs). We find no evidence that the level of and expected changes in foreign investment and trade affect the likelihood of adoption. Thus, we cannot confirm that IFRS lowers information costs in more globalized economies. We do find some evidence that the likelihood of IFRS adoption at first increases and then decreases in the quality of countries' domestic governance standards. This result can be interpreted as consistent with both the most poorly governed countries being less responsive to international standards, and all other countries conditioning their IFRS adoption decisions on the opportunity and switching costs of domestic governance standards.
The net political value of IFRS is the benefit arising from the potential political nature of international accounting standard setting. If countries expect the EU to have a dominant role in IASB affairs (Brackney and Witmer, 2005) , they are likely to have to cede some authority over standard setting to EU interests. Ceding authority over local standards is, in turn, likely to be less palatable to more powerful countries, which leads to the prediction that more powerful countries are less likely to embrace IFRS. There is evidence in the data consistent with this proposition. In addition to standard-setting power, cultural sensitivities can also affect the net political value of IFRS to a country. If the IASB is perceived as a European institution, countries that are culturally 29 more distant from Europe are likely to be less accepting of IFRS (Ding et al., 2005; Ciesielski, 2007; Norris, 2007) . However, we do not find evidence of cultural differences between adopters and non-adopters.
Our study of IFRS adoption at the country-level can complement recent firm-level studies on IFRS. The results of these firm-level studies are mixed. Barth et al. (2008) conclude that "firms applying [IFRS] from 21 countries generally evidence less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance of accounting amounts than do a matched sample of firms applying non-US domestic standards." Armstrong et al. (2008) in studying the stock market reaction in European companies to events associated with the adoption of IFRS in the EU also find evidence "consistent with investors expecting net information quality benefits from IFRS adoption." In contrast, Daske et al. (2008) are cautious "to attribute the capitalmarket effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate;" while Christensen et al. (2008) find that improvements in earnings management and timely loss recognition behavior among IFRS adopting firms are "confined to firms with incentives to adopt," suggesting that "incentives dominate [IFRS] in determining accounting quality."
Firm-level studies of IFRS adoption are conditional on countries' decisions to allow or mandate IFRS, suggesting that firm-level studies examine the second stage in what is at least a two-stage process. Further, since firm-level studies require significant amounts of cross-company data, they have been limited to firms in a few (mostly developed) countries where corporate financial reports are available in machine-readable format. By examining IFRS adoption across 102 different (non-EU) countries, we expand our understanding of the determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption to a more global sample. Our evidence of a higher IFRS adoption rate among countries with moderate governance standards is consistent with IFRS being adopted for reasons that can be beneficial to a country. At the same time, the evidence that the best governed and most powerful non-EU countries were, as of 2007, less likely to adopt IFRS, suggests that several countries still perceived IFRS as being costly.
We caution against any broad interpretation of the results in this paper in the context of any ongoing policy debate on IFRS adoption. There are two reasons for this caveat. First, the data in the paper on country-level IFRS adoption are based largely on information provided by Deloitte on its IASplus.com website. While even the IASB relies on these data (IASB, 2008a, b) , our correspondence with managing partners of non-Deloitte big-4 audit firms in some countries reveal potential errors in the IASplus.com dataset. The "errors" are likely due to disagreements among auditors on the extent to which a country has adopted IFRS: several countries adopt "modified" versions of IFRS, and we suspect auditors do not agree on whether the modifications are substantial enough to constitute something apart from IFRS.
Second, as noted earlier, our analysis covers IFRS adoption through year 2007. As more countries adopt the international standards, the network benefits from IFRS adoption are likely to increase. This, in turn, can change the relative importance of direct (autarky) benefits and costs in determining IFRS adoption. In other words, the determinants of IFRS adoption are likely to be dynamic, so the magnitude of coefficients documented in this paper are likely to vary as the set of adopters (or non-adopters) is expanded.
The network-theoretic framework we use to explain the adoption of IFRS across countrytime can be applied in the study of other accounting and corporate governance phenomena. For example, the adoption of accounting methods, accounting standards, and corporate governance best practices by firms and jurisdictions are likely to depend on similar such actions by competitors and associates. In other words, inter-temporal variation in adoption decisions in panel data, commonly studied in the accounting literature, can be explained by the "network"
value of the product being adopted. The method employed in this paper can be a first step towards a broader use of network theory in motivating such studies. See Appendix B for variable definitions and Table 1 for a description of the sample.
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Figure 1
Scatter plots of additional proxies for quality of local governance institutions on Q_Local_Gov1 (X axis) The sample is based on the list of countries on Deloitte's IASplus.com website; it excludes European Union (EU) member states and countries without GDP data on the World Bank's WDI database. Partial adopters include those that permit (but do not require) IFRS, as well as those that require IFRS for only some companies. See Appendix B for variable definitions and Table 1 for a description of the sample. Throughout Table 2 , ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. In Panel A, ***, **, and * compare statistics of EU countries with those of Non-EU countries. In Panels B and C, ***, **, and * compare statistics of Full Adopter and Partial Adopter countries with those of Non-Adopter countries. See Appendix B for variable and factor definitions and Table 1 for a description of the sample. 
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See Appendix B for variable definitions, Table 1 for a description of the sample, and Section 5.1 for a description of the regression model. Throughout, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. 
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See Appendix B for variable definitions, Table 1 for a description of the sample, and Section 5.1 for a description of the regression model. IASB_Trustees is the number of persons serving as IASB trustees for a given country in a given year. IASB_Donor is a dummy coded one if at least one organization from a given country in a given year contributed to the IASC Foundation. Throughout, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.
